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RECENT CASES

could be argued that conditions in a federal enclave, particularly a
military post, are completely foreign to civil authorities, and should
be the responsibility of the federal government. Since a state statute
is being interpreted, general policy considerations must fall to state
policies. Certainly one policy of a state is to conserve its funds-to
use them only when the interests of its taxpayers can be served. The
decision of the Colorado court is contrary to this policy.
CONCLUSION

In view of (1) the number of cases in which residents of ceded
areas have been denied rights common to residents of the state in

which the area is located, on both federal and non-federal grounds,
(2) the adoption of specific provisions to effectuate a contrary policy
found necessary in other states, (3) the absence of an avowed state
policy which would be served by a strict geographical definition
of the words "in the county," and (4) the unreasonableness of imputing an intent to the Colorado legislature to spend state money
for persons not otherwise subject to its laws, it is submitted that the
Colorado court erred in its interpretation of the statute in question.
Burke B. Terrell
TORTs-INFANTs-RiGnT OF ACTION IN
EmANCIPATED INFANT AGAINST

NEGLIGENCE PEBmIITED BY UN-

His UNE WCIPATED BRoTER-Plaintiff,

a thirteen-year-old infant, was injured in a collision with another car

while riding in a car owned and operated by his seventeen-year-old
brother. An action was filed by plaintiff's next friend against the drivers of both vehicles as co-defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the
gross negligence of his brother and the ordinary negligence of the
other driver were the proximate causes of his injuries. The defendantbrother moved to dismiss on the ground that there can be no recovery
in a tort action between unemancipated infant brothers. The circuit
court continued the case against the co-defendant, but dismissed the
action against the brother. From this ruling, the plaintiff appealed.
Held: Reversed and remanded. An unemancipated infant can maintain
an action against his unemancipated infant brother to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the latter's negligence.
Midkiff v. Midkiff, 118 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960).
The defendant argued that there is a common-law immunity
barring recovery in such actions. The court answered by stating
that it could find no cases supporting the defendant's argument,
but to the contrary, that it is well settled that an infant is liable for his
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torts, and that even if there were such an immunity there is no sound
reason for its continuance.'
The question of immunity in tort actions between unemancipated
infants of the same family was first discussed in Munsert v. Farmers
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,2 decided in 1938. In that case, the Wisconsin
court held that the father of a deceased infant could properly maintain a wrongful death action against the deceased's infant brother.
Since the wrongful death statute made a right of action in the deceased, had he lived, a prerequisite for an action by his representative, the court's decision necessarily denies the existence of an immunity between unemancipated infants of the same family.3 A year
later the issue was directly presented in the landmark case of Rozell v.
Rozell,4 where it was held that an unemancipated infant could maintain a tort action against his unemancipated sister for damage for
personal injuries.
When the problem arose in the Rozell case, the question wasand still is-whether immunity should be created, and not whether
there is an existing immunity to be rejected. One might contend
that an immunity in personal injury actions between brothers and
sisters should be created because of the analogous common-law decisions recognizing immunities between husband and wife and parent
and child. But there is no historical common-law background of legal
unity between unemancipated children as there is between husband
and wife. Nor is there the threatened disturbance of parental discipline which has been the primary common-law reason for maintaining an immunity between parent and child. Therefore, the analogy to the husband-and-wife or to the parent-and-child cases fails
because the historical reasons for the immunity in those cases are
not present in an action between unemancipated children of the
same family. Even these established immunities have recently been
rejected in some jurisdictions.5
I Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Va. 1960). One might speculate
as to why there was no earlier litigation involving this specific problem. The
tendency of members of a family to settle their non-property problems out of court
contributed to this lack of litigation. The uncertainty created by the history of the
other intra-family immunities, i.e., between parent and child and between husband
and wife, is another reason. The most important reason was the absence of automobile liability insurance. Without this insurance, there seems to be no practical
reason for minors of the same family to sue one another. Liability insurance, attended by the greater use of the automobile, should contribute to an increase
in the volume of this litigation. See 27 Geo. L. J. 643, 644 (1939).
2229
Wis. 581, - 281 N.W. 671, 673 (1988).
3
Beilke v. Knasch, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
4281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
5
E.g., Harlan Natl Bank, Adm'r v. Gross, - S.W.2d-, (Ky. 1961) (parentchild); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (husband-wife).
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Several other arguments supporting immunity have been advanced, the most frequent are the following: (1) that immunity is
in accord with the public policy of protecting domestic tranquility
and maintaining the family unit; 6 (2) that immunity is necessary
for the prevention of fraud and collusion;7 and (3) that the courts
should wait for legislation before approving actions between unemancipated children of the same family.8
The first argument, that the immunity protects domestic tranquility, was rejected by Judge Traynor, speaking for the Supreme
Court of California in Emery v. Emery,9 as merely a "speculative
assumption," since granting immunity between unemancipated brothers and sisters would not necessarily guarantee domestic tranquility.
He reasoned that an uncompensated injury was as likely to interfere
with domestic tranquility as a personal injury action between unemancipated children. The domestic tranquility argument is further
weakened by the availability of liability insurance. Domestic tranquility will hardly be disturbed by an action which allows an injured child to reach insurance proceeds. If such insurance is not
available, the choice of means to insure family harmony is best left
within the family.
The second argument, that the immunity prevents fraud and collusion, has also been rejected.' 0 Even if it is legitimate to fear fraud
or collusion, the courts should be able to ferret it out, as they must in
many other situations." The fact that the question has been considered in only six cases 12 may indicate that there is an absence of fraud
and collusion.' 3
The third argument, that the courts should await appropriate
legislation, misconceives the problem, because the basic assumption
that an immunity exists is fallacious. Since the courts are being asked
to create, not to destroy immunity, it is clearly within the province
of the court's function to allow the action without prior legislative
oRozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, -, 22 N.E.2d 254, 255 (1939); Midkiff
v. Midkiff,
113 S.E.2d 875, 876 (Va. 1960).
7
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, -, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955); Rozell v.

Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, -, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1989).
8 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, -, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939).
0 45 Cal. 2d 421, -, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955).
1OEmery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, -, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955).
11Rozell v. RozeU 281 N.Y. 106,

-

22 N.E.2d 854, 257 (1939); 38

Mich. L. Rev. 743, 745 (1940).
'2 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289, P. 2d 218 (1955); Becker v. Riech,
19 Misc. 2d 104, 188 N.Y.S. 2d 724 (1959); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22
N.E.2d 254 (1989); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 388, 57 A. 2d 426
(1948); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 118 S.W. 2d 875 (Va. 1960); Munsert v. Farmers Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938). See also Prosser, Torts
§ 101, at 677 (2d ed. 1955); 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 97 pp. 489, 440 (1944).
1 See Miller v. Monser, 228 Minn. 400, -, 87 N.W.2d 543, 546 (1949).
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approval. Even if the immunity ever existed, as the New York court
reasoned in the Rozell case, "it is not necessarily the function of a
court to refuse to declare a rule of conduct until the economic and
social order of the day forces its declaration by the state."1 4 This is
sound reasoning in light of the history of our judicial system in which
the courts have seldom waited for legislative action on matters that
could be solved by the courts themselves. Courts are always subject
to legislative command, but they do not have to wait for it.
When the problem arises in those jurisdictions which have not
yet decided the question, it is probable that disposition favorable to
suit will be made as it has so far in every jurisdiction which has
considered it. Reason and justice point in this direction. 15
Philip Taliaferro, III
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ICiPAL AND INCOME-ALLOC&TION OF IN-

DisposED OF BY THE EXECUTOR TO T
INCOME BENEFcCLRY-Testatrix, leaving a probate estate of $480,000,
provided for payments of taxes, debts, legacies, and expenses out of
her "general estate" in items I-V of her will. In item VI she bequeathed to a trustee "all the rest, residue and remainder" of her
estate in two equal trusts for the benefit of her niece and nephew.
During the administration period $3,500 was earned on properties
which were subsequently disposed of by the executor to cover debts,
taxes, legacies and other administrative costs. Unable to determine
whether this particular income should be allocated to the income
beneficiaries or added to corpus, the executor instituted an action for
declaration of rights to the specified income. The trial court found
for the income beneficiaries. Held: Affirmed. Absent a contrary
manifestation of intent, the income beneficiary of the residuary trust
is entitled to the whole income derived from the residuary estate,
CoME

14

FROM PROPER=S

Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, -, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939).

15 If the problem should arise in Kentucky, the Rozell doctrine should be
accepted. This would be a natural development in the favorable climate created
by Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), which held that a wife could
sue her husband for damages for personal injuries. Before that case, Kentucky
was one of the great majority of courts which steadfastly followed the commonlaw rule of husband-wife immunity. The remaining intra-family immunity parentchild, has just recently been stricken down in Kentucky. Harlan Natl Bank, Adm'r
v. Gross, -S.W.2d-, (Ky. 1961), overruling Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d
276 (Ky. 1954). It is hoped that Kentucky will continue the liberalizing
trend in family-relationship cases by following the unanimous line of decisions
rejecting the creation of an immunity between unemancipated minors of the same
family.

